Nanotechnology and Nature: On Two Criteria for Understanding Their Relationship by Schiemann, Gregor
HYLE--International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry, Vol. 11, No.1 (2005), pp. 77-96. 
http://www.hyle.org  
Copyright © 2005 by HYLE and Gregor Schiemann 
 
 
 
 
Special Issue on "Nanotech Challenges", P
Nanotechnology and Nature 
On Two Criteria for Understanding Their 
Relationship 
 
Gregor Schiemann* 
   
Abstract: Two criteria are proposed for characterizing the diverse 
and not yet perspicuous relations between nanotechnology and 
nature. They assume a concept of nature as that which is not made 
by human action. One of the criteria endorses a distinction between 
natural and artificial objects in nanotechnology; the other allows for 
a discussion of the potential nanotechnological modification of 
nature. Insofar as current trends may be taken as indicative of future 
development, nanotechnology might increasingly use the model of 
nature as a point of orientation, while many of its products will 
continue to be clearly distinguished from nature. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between nanotechnology and nature does not presently admit
of uniform description. By way of an introductory presentation of the problem, I
would like to sketch a provisional characterization based upon central aspects of
nanotechnological and natural objects respectively. Nanotechnological objects
rank among those technically produced objects that emerge from processes "that
exhibit fundamental control of the physical and chemical attributes of
molecular-scale structures" (Stix 2001, p. 9). Nanotechnology brings with it the
possibility of a precisely projectable alteration of nature on the scale of
molecules. Nanotechnology comprises not only the manipulation of natural
molecules, but also the creation of molecules not found in nature. In this sense,
molecules or other objects are natural if they are not produced through human
Seite 1 von 18HYLE 11-1 (2005): Nanotechnology and Nature
28.09.2008file://E:\- Eigene Dateien\- 3 eigene Texte\2 Veröffentlichungen (elektr. Kopien)\2000...
action. 
The multifariousness of the relationship between nanotechnology and nature is 
expressed in the fact that some nanotechnological objects are clearly distinct 
from comparable natural objects, while others are identical to natural objects. I 
shall begin with some examples of non-natural nanotechnological products, 
recognizable – as is the case with other products of human action – by their 
obviously artificial origin. 
? For medical purposes, certain molecules are synthesized that are designed 
to direct medicine to particular parts of the body, and which – as far as is 
known – do not exist in nature.  
? The production of materials by means of nanotechnology is of interest to 
the materials sciences because these materials possess characteristics 
(e.g. firmness) that make them more suitable for the fabrication of 
macroscopic products than those made from natural substances.  
? Miniscule electrical and mechanical systems are to be constructed 
analogously to larger systems utilized today, which are not modeled upon 
natural patterns.  
Nano-products that do not exist in nature form an artificial world whose 
relationship to nature is problematic. On the one hand, uncontrolled releases 
from such nano-objects could constitute a new dimension of life-threatening 
pollutants. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that even the controlled 
insertion of non-natural nanoproducts into nature – particularly into the human 
body – may entail substantial risks. In both cases these dangers would be linked 
to the extreme minuteness and to the reactivity of these products. They may 
enter biotic systems deeply and irreversibly, affecting life functions not 
positively but deranging or destroying them with lethal effects. Compared to 
previous conventional macroscopic technologies, nanotechnology relates 
differently to nature inasmuch as it can affect the functionality of natural 
systems on the smallest scale. 
Nanotechnology, however, does not only create an artificial world that is 
distinct from nature. It also relates to natural processes and materials in a new 
way.[1] In this respect it is difficult to separate it from nature. Here, too, I 
would like to give some examples. 
? There is hope that the development of nanotechnology may not only 
permit the production of artificial made-to-measure materials, but also 
improve conditions for the perfect artificial reproduction of substances 
that can only be derived from nature through difficult procedures.  
? In the bottom-up-production of materials, nanotechnology already uses 
techniques of self-organization – which are similar to processes that 
appear in nature (e.g. the spontaneous creation of GaAs-quantum points).  
? On the product level, there are nanotechnological systems in which 
objects of biotic origin are used. Since the functions of such objects are 
partly independent of their origins, the characterization with which we 
began is a problematic basis for distinguishing between nature and 
nanotechnology. DNA-molecules, for example, are utilized in electronic 
components. Other nano-products are to have new kinds of 
biocompatible (e.g. coatings of artificial joints) or bioanalogue (e.g. 
hydrophobe) features.  
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Nanotechnological products and techniques that are closely related or even 
identical to natural materials and processes may cause just as much harm to 
nature as those that are clearly distinct from nature. For instance, the degree to 
which an artificially produced substance is life threatening is not clearly related 
to the degree of its structural similarity to natural substances. To mention 
another example, the introduction of artificially produced nature-identical 
substances into natural cycles can lead to considerable interferences of these 
cycles. But despite justified objections to the use of the model of nature as a 
point of orientation, there is still hope that the dangers of nanotechnology could 
be reduced by an increasing proximity to nature. 
The practical relevance of the dangers to life processes that might emerge from 
nanotechnology constitute probably the most important motivation for 
investigating the relationship between nanotechnology and nature. But, with 
respect to a technology that permits the synthetic production of nature-identical 
objects and that is able on demand to execute minute changes in nature on the 
molecular scale, the question of its relationship to nature emerges also in 
theoretical terms. Is it at all possible to distinguish between nature and 
technology if nature has already become technologically malleable at the level 
of molecules? Can nature – if it is distinguishable from technology at all – set 
limits to technology? Against the background of Western culture, where nature 
is conceived through its opposition to technology, the importance of these 
problems cannot be overestimated. While technology as a human creation is 
regarded as completely transparent, a separate reality is ascribed to nature. The 
contrast between technology and nature is to be considered most obvious in the 
case of living nature – organisms are paradigmatic of a nature not produced by 
human beings. Up to now, the concept of nature has had a central function in 
shaping the Western worldview, which would be undermined if it became 
impossible to maintain its difference from technology. 
But can these questions be answered if the relationship between 
nanotechnology and nature is itself manifold? One could be tempted to assume 
that a restriction of the term nanotechnology would lead to a more unequivocal 
statement. But this suggestion is rendered implausible by the fact that 
nanotechnological research is still in its early stages. According to the 
unanimous judgment of its analysts, most disciplines of nanotechnology have 
not yet reached the stage of producing functioning technology, but are still 
researching their object fields.[2] There are endeavors underway in various 
disciplines to shed light on the scarcely analyzed structures of the nanoworld. 
Thus, a specification of this term would only conditionally restrict the variety 
of disciplines belonging to it. Nor is a reduction of the scope of the concept of 
nature likely to clarify the different ways in which nano-objects are related to 
nature. The concept of nature that I proposed earlier corresponds – as I aim to 
show – to the common and justifiably used conception of nature in 
nanotechnology. It allows different relations to nanotechnology in general and 
in specific areas. Therefore, I would argue that under the present circumstances 
the relationship between nanotechnological and natural objects cannot be 
described in uniform terms. 
But the diversity of the relations between nanotechnology and nature does not 
necessarily imply a diversity of the criteria for describing these relations. 
Rather, I would assume that the various relations can be characterized by a 
single set of criteria that make it possible to give initial answers to the 
aforementioned questions. In so doing, one cannot rely on the philosophical 
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discussion of nanotechnology, which until now has been poorly developed.[3] 
The proposed concept of nature forms a proper starting point, as it makes it 
possible to develop two basic criteria for characterizing the relationship 
between nanotechnology and nature. 
? First, the concept of nature as that which is not produced by human 
beings suggests a criterion for distinguishing between natural and 
artificial nanotechnological objects (Section 3).  
? Secondly, this concept of nature makes it possible to formulate a criterion 
for delimiting the scope of nanotechnology (Section 4).  
The most important point in the discussion of the relationship between 
nanotechnology and nature is the contrast between nanotechnology and living 
nature. None of the known laws of nature excludes the possibility that life could 
in the future be produced artificially by means of nanotechnology. If the 
difference between the objects of nanotechnology and those of living nature 
were to be dissolved, it would be the most fundamental conceivable change in 
the relationship between nanotechnology and nature (Section 5). 
Before I expound these criteria, I would like to elucidate the concept of 
nanotechnology with which I began in order to clarify what aspects of it enter 
into a relationship with nature. 
 
 
2. On the definition of nanotechnology 
The initial understanding of nanotechnology is only a part of a definition 
proposed by Mihail C. Roco, according to which nanotechnological materials 
and systems have the following ‘key properties’: "they have at least one 
dimension of about one to 100 nanometers, they are designed through processes 
that exhibit fundamental control of the physical and chemical attributes of 
molecular-scale structures, and they can be combined to form larger 
structures" (Stix 2001, p. 9).[4] 
Nanotechnology is the application of scientific knowledge for the purpose of 
producing such materials and systems. In the present phase of investigating 
elementary conditions of production, technological and basic scientific research 
are merging. Wherever I do not explicitly differentiate between nanotechnology 
and nanoscience, the term ‘nanotechnology’ includes nanoscience. 
I want to adopt Roco’s definition and make two additions. The first concerns 
the origin and purpose of nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is – as all 
technology – a human affair. In this respect, the relation of nanotechnology to 
nature is reduced to the relation of human beings and their actions to nature. As 
a human affair, nanotechnology is a cultural-historical phenomenon that uses 
appropriate and knowledge-based ability in pursuance of objectives. The 
concept of nanotechnology can only be used in an analogous or metaphoric 
manner to describe non-human nature; strictly speaking, there are no 
nanotechnological processes or products in nature. The next section, however, 
will give some examples that show why not all nanotechnologists would agree 
with this view. 
My second addition concerns the relation of nanotechnology to other 
Seite 4 von 18HYLE 11-1 (2005): Nanotechnology and Nature
28.09.2008file://E:\- Eigene Dateien\- 3 eigene Texte\2 Veröffentlichungen (elektr. Kopien)\2000...
technologies. By ‘fundamental control’ of attributes, I understand a realization 
of desired attributes that goes beyond the manipulation of already existing 
attributes. Here the definition distinguishes nanotechnology from gene- and 
biotechnology (which frequently deal with objects of a size above nanoscale).
[5] The attributes of gene- and biotechnological objects are not produced but, 
rather, modified by exerting influence. Without this distinction between 
disciplines, it would be impossible to differentiate between the transfer 
directions of nanotechnology and biotechnology. 
The definition does not rule out that biotic materials or living beings could be 
produced in the future by means of nanotechnology, nor does it deny the 
already existing transitions and contacts between nano-, gene- and 
biotechnology. Its application to current technological possibilities leads, 
however, to a division into the mainly abiotic products of nanotechnology on 
the one hand, and the mainly biotic products of gene- and biotechnology on the 
other. In this respect, current nanotechnology is clearly distinct from a nature 
that includes living beings. 
 
 
3. Nature as that which is not produced by human 
action 
As in the natural sciences and in most other technological fields, fundamental 
categories like the concept of nature are not a subject of discussion in 
nanotechnology. When they are explicitly used, it is normally only in 
publications that address a broader audience or the audience of other disciplines 
– and therefore somewhat vaguely. The concept of nature takes on various 
meanings in these contexts, which I assume are also relevant in scientific 
practice. I have chosen three representative and electronically accessible 
publications as examples and scanned them for appearances of the term 
‘nature’: the brochure Nanotechnology. Shaping the World Atom by Atom, 
published by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) in the US 
in 1999; the volume Understanding Nanotechnology, compiled by the journal 
Scientific American in 2001; and the Springer Handbook of Nanotechnology, 
published by B. Bhushan in 2004. 
An adjectival and a substantival usage can be differentiated as the two primary 
meanings in these texts. These also correspond to the two meanings of nature 
given in The New Oxford Dictionary of English (without being labeled as such). 
The adjectival usage describes "the basic or inherent features of something, 
especially when seen as characteristic of it". A typical example is, for instance, 
"the wave nature of electrons" (NSTC 1999, p. 1) or "the cyclic nature of this 
process" (Bhushan 2004, p. 156). Since this meaning does not refer to specific 
properties and can only be understood contextually, I will ignore it here. 
The substantival usage is divided into an extensional and an intensional 
meaning. Both can also be found in The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 
although they are not labeled as such. In its extensional meaning, nature refers 
to "the phenomena of the physical world collectively […] as opposed to 
humans or human creations"; in its intensional meaning, it is "the physical force 
regarded as causing and regulating these phenomena". The extension 
demarcates the scope of the concept negatively – namely, through the contrast 
to human action. The intension, on the other hand, cites properties – such as a 
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physical force – by way of a positive characterization.[6] 
A typical example of the extensional understanding is the reference, which 
appears in all three publications, to "nature’s own nanotechnology, which 
emerged billions of years ago when molecules began organizing into the 
complex structures that could support life" (NSTC 1999, p. 1; similarly, 
Scientific American 2001, p. 9; Bhushan 2004, p. 2). This understanding gives 
rise to a distinction between natural and synthetic objects. Hence, we learn, for 
example, "that nature constructs its objects" (Bhushan 2004, p. 246), or that an 
artificially established function is "unprecedented in nature" (Bhushan 2004, p. 
283). The intensional usages differ from the aforementioned encyclopedic 
notion in that the characteristics given also include human action and their 
products. Thus, the NSTC brochure quotes from Richard Feynman’s famous 
speech ‘There is Plenty of Room at the Bottom’ (1959): "But we must always 
accept some atomic arrangement that nature gives us" (NSTC 1999, p. 4). In the 
same vein, Michael L. Roukes refers to the concept of nature by stating, 
"Nature has already set the rules for us" (Scientific American 2001, p. 32). 
These examples are the product of an intuitive technological understanding of 
nature, according to which nature is a resource for the realization of human 
purposes. With respect to conceptual precision – which, admittedly, is not 
decisive in the context of these publications – it leaves much to be desired. Part 
of the terminological haziness is also due to the ambiguity of the concept of 
technology, which is not consistently opposed to that of nature but, rather, 
partly transferred to natural processes. Furthermore, relations between 
intensional and extensional meanings of nature are not taken into account, and 
there is no criterion for distinguishing between natural and artificial objects. 
These desiderata can be attained by specifying more precisely the concept of 
nature I proposed earlier. 
The concept of nature that I am going to elaborate follows the intuitive 
understanding of nature by assuming a positive characterization not of nature, 
but of human purposes: nature is that which is not made by human action. This 
concept is distinct from traditional definitions, which attribute positive 
attributes to nature – such as self-movement in Aristotle, or expansion in 
Descartes.[7] I use the expression ‘not made by human action’ in a narrow and 
in a broad sense. While the narrow sense refers to objects whose existence does 
not originate in human action, the broad sense describes the empirical content 
of laws of nature – which is not at humans’ disposal[8] – and thus comprehends 
predetermined conditions to which human action is subjected. In this section I 
focus on the narrow, in the next section on the broad sense. 
In view of the sophistication of today’s technology, scientific methods are 
required to determine whether an object owes its existence to human action. 
Thus, I would like to introduce an epistemic criterion according to which an 
object is natural if it is impossible with all scientific methods available at a 
given time to detect that it was produced by human action; alternatively, an 
object is to be defined as artificial if it can be scientifically demonstrated that it 
was produced by human action. This criterion makes the distinction between 
natural and artificial objects an empirical matter, subject to experimental 
methods of assessing the naturalness of technological products – similar to the 
Turing-test of artificial intelligence.[9] An artificially produced object would 
therefore belong to nature if all scientific methods available at a given time 
could not succeed in distinguishing it from an identical natural object. This 
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application of the criterion presumes of course all knowledge about existing 
natural objects.[10] 
I want to elucidate this criterion by appealing to some examples: according to 
this criterion, the atoms dealt with in nanotechnology are natural if they stem 
from natural substances or if it becomes impossible scientifically to ascertain 
their artificial origin. Insofar as natural substances are designed differently in 
nanotechnology than in nature, nanotechnological products are always hybrids 
of nature and art. The criterion does not challenge the naturalness of an object 
merely if it is influenced by human action. Thus, atoms do not lose their 
naturalness because they must first be isolated in order to be assembled in a 
different pattern. As for this assemblage, it is possible to distinguish several 
ways in which an influence can artificially be exerted. A weak form of 
influence would be to create the appropriate conditions under which a process 
of synthesis would run independently. Processes of self-organization in the 
production of quantum points are a good example of this form of influence.[11] 
Production that requires a special operation at each step represents a stronger 
form of influence. This applies, for example, to the movement of atoms, which 
M. Eigler used in 1989 to produce the IBM-logo in nanoscale. 
The criterion can be applied to all of the examples that I mentioned earlier in 
order to illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing between natural and artificial 
objects. According to the criterion, if nanotechnology succeeds in constructing 
perfect replicas of naturally existing molecules, they should be considered 
natural the moment when their artificial origin ceases to be demonstrable (e.g. 
when mingled with the corresponding natural molecules). Each component of 
self-organizational processes that are used in the production of nano products 
and each property of completed nano products can be assessed to determine 
whether it is natural or artificial. Nonetheless, the application of the criterion is 
not unproblematic. Artificial properties may, for instance, unknowingly be 
added to a substance when it is extracted from its natural environment. 
It may appear odd that nanotechnological objects, e.g. synthetic molecules, 
should lose their artificial character the moment they cease to be (scientifically) 
distinguishable from natural objects. However, this not only corresponds to 
traditional concepts of nature[12] and to current linguistic conventions in 
nanotechnology (as discussed above), but also reveals the point where the 
distinction between human-made products and nature becomes senseless. 
I suspect, though, that most nanotechnological objects are still distinguishable 
from natural objects and will continue to be in the near future. I see three 
reasons why the artificial character of nanotechnological objects should remain 
apparent for the time being. First of all, the focal point of nanotechnology is to 
produce artificial objects that are more useful for human purposes than natural 
ones. Since these objects are intended to differ in their effects from natural 
objects, they can be expected to remain distinguishable from them. Secondly, 
the scientific methods of revealing an object’s artificial origin are so 
sophisticated that they would probably still be able to identify an artificial 
object even if it were very similar (not identical) to equivalent natural objects. 
Thirdly, there is still a clear difference between nanotechnological and natural 
processes, as I shall illustrate in Section 5, where I discuss the example of 
living nature 
This epistemic criterion builds upon the narrow understanding of nature as that 
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which is not produced by human action. It inquires into the genesis of any 
produced object, but unfolds its efficacy only when it becomes problematic to 
ascertain an object’s artificial origin. Nanotechnological objects provide 
characteristic examples. By having the greatest possible influence on the 
properties of its materials, nanotechnology can blur the traces of its 
interventions to the most comprehensive extent. 
 
 
4. The lawfulness of nature in the nano world 
In this section, I will return to the broad sense of the term ‘nature’. It does not 
necessarily refer to the genesis of objects, but generally to those regular 
properties that are beyond human influence, and which sciences express as 
laws. Natural laws represent the universally valid expression of the conjunction 
of conditions under which an event or a state regularly obtains. 
As revisable, mostly mathematical constructions, natural laws are human-made. 
True observational statements, however, which are predicted by these laws and 
constitute their empirical content, refer to the natural prerequisites of human 
action. Hence, their truth does not depend on the specific experimental 
conditions under which the corresponding phenomena are produced or 
discovered. The empirical content of the laws of nature delimits the scope 
within which nanotechnology can unfold its potential.[13] 
Between nature in this sense and nanotechnology, there is a certain tension, 
which has recently been the subject of discussions about the potential of human 
constructions on the nanoscale. Particularly at issue are physical and chemical 
laws, which must be taken into account in planning nanotechnological 
constructs. In the following, I will focus on physical laws, which present plans 
have to take into consideration. In the next section I will move to discussions of 
technological constructs (e.g. Eric Drexler’s assemblers) whose future 
conditions of realization are controversial. 
A large portion of the current projects in nanotechnology are designed to 
advance the miniaturization of technology. This tendency is especially strong in 
electronics (Fahrner 2003, p. 1-3). Nanotechnological constructions are to 
reproduce traditional electronic components (switches, diodes, transistors, etc.) 
on a nanoscale. One main goal of this effort is to open up new dimensions of 
data processing, namely through the storage of large amounts of data in the 
smallest possible space (e.g. the British Library in a sugar cube). These plans 
are countered by the assertion that new laws have to be expected at the nano 
level, which emerge from the fact that this field lies between the atomic and 
subatomic quantum phenomena on the one hand, and the continuous 
phenomena of systems with large numbers of atoms on the other. Because of 
the intermediary position of the nanoscale, it is also called ‘mesoworld’. In this 
world, not only known quantum phenomena appear (e.g. the uncertainty 
principle or the tunnel effect), but also the known phenomena of continuum 
physics (e.g. heat flow). There are even some new regularities that emerge, like 
the quantization of electrical and thermal conductance. The quantization of 
electrical conductance has already turned out to be a fundamental feature of the 
smallest structures of conductors. The quantum nature of heat flow was first 
observed in 2000 in narrow silicon nitride bridges, constituting a fundamental 
lower limit of this flow in minute objects that can conduct heat (Roukes 2001a, 
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2001b). 
These phenomena restrict technology’s ability to maneuver on the nanoscale 
(Fogelberg & Glimell 2003, p. 18. The question whether a quantized current 
flow is technologically utilizable remains problematic; the quantum nature of 
heat flow could hinder the necessary cooling of electronic and mechanical nano 
building components. Roukes comments on the novel regularities discovered in 
the mesoworld as follows: "The nanoworld is often portrayed by novelists, 
futurists and the popular press as a place of infinite possibilities. But this 
domain is not some ultra miniature version of the Wild West. Not everything 
goes there; there are laws" (Roukes 2001a, p. 26). 
Corresponding to the tension between nature as the lawful constitution of 
reality and nanotechnology, there is a conflict between scientists’ interest in 
knowledge and engineers’ interest in applications. Roukes represents the 
scientific position, stating that understanding laws is a precondition for 
technological applications: "Much exotic territory awaits exploration. As we 
delve into it, we will uncover a panoply of phenomena that we must understand 
before practical nanotechnology will become possible" (Roukes 2001a, p. 21). 
Engineering technology, in contrast, is less interested in the clarification of 
lawful coherence than in its utilization for technological purposes. P. Chaudhari 
of IBM Watson Research expresses this position by stating the following: "The 
engineers were not so much concerned with understanding the laws of nature 
but rather in using them to build something useful for mankind" (Chaudhari 
2001, p. 78). 
 
 
5. The relationship between living nature and 
nanotechnology 
Up to the present, living nature has been considered the epitome of that which 
is not human-made. As much as the organic structures of living beings have 
been changed through human intervention, human beings have not yet 
succeeded in producing life itself. Life processes occur in dimensions that are 
so complex and minute as to be only conditionally accessible. At this level, 
nanotechnology promises to open up new opportunities. It is among the 
disciplines that develop means to create life artificially – be it as a 
reconstruction of existing forms of life or as a construction of a differently 
designed artificial form of life. 
Against this background, it is striking that not only current nanotechnological 
research but also the most boldly futuristic visions of nanotechnology are 
confined to non-living constructions. Correspondingly, artificial life is 
mentioned neither in Eric Drexler’s futurist books (Drexler 1986, Drexler et al. 
1991) nor in connection with nanotechnology in the optimistic report 
Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance (Roco & 
Bainbridge 2002). 
In my view, the restriction of nanotechnology – both in current practice and in 
futuristic visions – to the construction of non-living systems reflects a gap 
between technological and biological objects, which also exists at the nano 
level. Following Stuemper-Jansen 1994, I have compiled some of the 
characteristic differences between technological and biological systems in 
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Table 1. I want to underscore the abilities of organisms to self-replicate and to 
self-repair, which have not even begun to be realized in abiotic technological 
systems. Moreover, whereas metabolic processes in living organisms produce 
energy by degrading endogenous substances, technological systems depend 
upon energy usually supplied from outside. The comparatively low efficiency 
of technological systems makes it necessary that they be cooled. 
Eric Drexler believes that the difference between living nature and non-living 
nanotechnology originates from the fact that living nature must submit to the 
struggle for survival even at the lowest level of the generation of its products. 
He quotes Ralph Merkle approvingly: "It’s both uneconomical and more 
difficult to design a self-replicating system that manufactures every part it 
needs from naturally occurring compounds. Bacteria do this, but in the process 
they have to synthesize all twenty amino acids and many other compounds, 
using elaborate enzyme systems tailored specifically for the purpose. For 
bacteria facing a hostile world, the ability to adapt and respond to a changing 
environment is worth almost any cost, for lacking this ability they would be 
wiped out" (Drexler et al. 1991). Under the conditions of the struggle for 
survival, organisms have developed an adaptability, which is normally not 
inherent in technologically produced systems designed to serve human 
purposes. As Merkle – referring to the example of machines – puts it: "The 
machines made by human beings bear little resemblance with living systems, 
and this is most likely to be true for molecular production systems. […] 
Machines do not have this marvelous adaptability of living systems" (Merkle 
2001, p. 184). 
Table 1: Characteristic differences between technological and 
biological systems 
  Typical realization in 
technological systems 
Typical realization in 
biological systems 
production 
process 
- top-down (bottom-up, 
self-organization only in 
nano- and biotechnology)
- technological methods 
for large amounts 
- bottom-up, self-
organization processes 
(incl. self-replication and 
self-repair) 
- slow growth of 
functional units on the 
molecular level, 
connection to larger 
systems 
controllability - possible only in small 
parts at atomic or 
molecular levels or as 
statistical ensembles 
- by means of numerous 
specialized systems 
combining in a network 
on the molecular level 
materials - generalized building set 
(wide range of elements 
and compounds with 
various properties) 
- flexible basic building 
set (few classes of bio-
materials, optimized for 
various functions) 
energy input - high (often in high 
temperature range), 
comparatively low 
- low (highly efficient 
transformation chain with 
chemical substrates, but 
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As a property that distinguishes organic beings from nanotechnological 
products, adaptability is one example of the application of the epistemic 
criterion for distinguishing between natural and artificial objects. For the time 
being, the lack of adaptability of the latter attests to a human origin. 
Nanotechnological development of adaptable products, e.g. the context-
dependant adaptation of a substance’s surface properties, constitutes a step 
toward dissolving the difference between nature and technology. 
The difference between living nature and non-living nanotechnology has also 
provided the backdrop for a controversy in the past few years, mainly between 
Richard E. Smalley and Eric Drexler, regarding the future possibilities of 
technology on a nanoscale. The subject of the argument has been, above all, the 
question to what extent nanotechnological production will be possible without 
reference to already existing biological processes. Drexler follows Richard 
Feynman’s program, according to which nanotechnology is "fundamentally 
mechanical, not biological" (Drexler 2003). Drexler’s plans envision computer-
programmed robots on a nanoscale, so-called assemblers, that assemble single 
molecules with atomic precision in order to produce themselves or other 
objects. Smalley, on the other hand, considers such nano-scale mechanical self-
replication and production of objects to be physically impossible. According to 
Smalley, moving single molecules does not suffice to produce stable chemical 
compounds. In his opinion, the entire reaction scale has to be controlled. For 
this purpose even the smallest robot would be too big (Smalley 2001, 
Whitesides 2001, Jones 1995). Moreover, the molecules to be moved would 
adhere to the arms of the robots (Smalley 2001, 2003). Smalley concludes that 
"such a nanobot will never become more than a futurist’s daydream" (Smalley 
2001).[14] 
Smalley’s arguments illustrate the application of the second criterion, which 
refers to natural laws. This criterion is not conducive to distinguishing among 
objects, but it defines the scope that natural laws set for potential 
nanotechnological object design. In Smalley’s view, the production of nanobots 
contradicts physical laws and is therefore impossible. 
Smalley believes that the fabrication of products on a nanoscale would require 
"something very much like an enzyme". "Any such system will need a liquid 
medium. For the enzymes we know about, that liquid will have to be water, and 
the types of things that can be synthesized with water around cannot be much 
efficiency, loss through 
cooling 
therefore also with 
molecular by-products) 
environmental 
sustainability 
- frequently problematic - bio-degradable 
products, usually 
unproblematic under 
natural conditions 
durability, 
stability, 
changeability 
- technological solutions 
over a broad scale of 
environmental conditions 
(T, p, pH, etc.) 
- usually stable long-
term; but, no self-repair, 
inflexible 
- comparatively 
susceptible 
- but: renewable, flexible, 
able to regenerate, natural 
degradation processes, 
self-correcting 
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broader than the meat and bone of biology" (Smalley 2003). According to 
Smalley, the limits posed by natural laws compel nanotechnology to orient 
itself toward the model of existing biological systems. George M. Whitesides 
sees a larger scope for nanotechnology. He, too, assumes that there is presently 
a difference between biological and nanotechnological systems, and considers 
the realization of Drexler’s assembler vision impossible. In his view, only two 
possibilities remain for the production of nanomachines. "The first is to take 
existing nanomachines – those present in the cell – and learn from them. […] 
The second is to start from scratch and independently to develop fundamental 
new types of nanosystems. […] It will be a marvelous challenge to see if we 
can outdesign evolution. It would be a staggering accomplishment to mimic the 
simplest living cell" (Whitesides 2001). However, since this approach is much 
more difficult than the first one, he considers it unlikely to be implemented. 
Therefore, it also seems reasonable to him for nanotechnology to assume the 
model of existing biotic nature. 
The controversy among Drexler, Smalley, and Whiteside illustrates two 
positions with respect to the divergent directions in which nanotechnology may 
be developed in the future: Nanotechnology could develop independently or 
follow the model of nature. The first way would mean the creation of an 
increasingly artificial world apart from nature; the second a new dimension of 
connection between technology and nature. Both scenarios would clearly be 
distinct from the traditional relationship between macroscopic technology and 
nature. The latter is characterized by the fact that while it admits of a distinction 
between technology and nature, it also interrelates the two. In the future, either 
the element of interrelation, with increasing artificiality, or that of 
distinguishability, with the establishment of a new dimension of connection 
between nanotechnology and nature, may become less relevant. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
I have defined nanotechnology as a human affair. The human origin of 
nanotechnological methods clearly distinguishes them from nature insofar as 
nature is not produced by human action. But this distinction does not 
necessarily apply to the relationship between nanotechnological and natural 
objects. Nanotechnological objects are designed to serve human purposes. 
Nanotechnologically produced substances, which are appropriate as industrial 
materials, are just as unlikely to be found in nature as nanoelectrical switches 
and nanomechanical gears. On the other hand, nanotechnology offers unique 
ways of using natural processes and re-building natural objects, or of 
substituting equivalent alternatives. Large molecules can be assembled from 
naturally occurring atoms in such a way that they become indistinguishable 
from molecules of natural origin. Since both of these aspects presently play a 
role in the relationship between nanotechnology and nature, this relationship 
cannot be characterized uniformly. 
The multifariousness of the relationship between nanotechnology and nature, 
however, does not prevent the application of uniform criteria for characterizing 
it. In order to show this, I considered a conception of nature that is common 
among nanotechnologists. This notion conceives of nature as that which is not 
made by human action. I distinguished two senses of this concept. While the 
narrow sense refers to objects that do not originate in human action, the broad 
sense describes the empirical content of laws of nature, which is not at humans’ 
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disposal. 
Building upon the narrow sense, I proposed an epistemic criterion according to 
which an object is natural if it is impossible – using all available scientific 
methods at a given time – to ascertain that it was produced by human action. 
This criterion makes it possible to distinguish – analogously to the Turing-test 
of artificial intelligence – between natural and artificial components of most 
nanotechnological processes and products. Given the multifariousness of the 
relationship between nanotechnology and nature, there are cases where it 
becomes problematic to distinguish between the two. I assume, however, that 
these cases are exceptions. Nanotechnological objects are mostly hybrids of 
nature and art; only in a few cases would they be said to be wholly natural 
because their artificial origin could no longer be confirmed.[15] 
The broad sense of the concept of nature led to a criterion for the scope of 
current and future nanotechnology. Whatever the future development of the 
relationship between nanotechnology and nature might be, nanotechnology will 
be subject to a reality that is structured by the laws of nature. The empirical 
content of laws refers to that which precedes human action. Nature in this sense 
is already relevant for nanotechnology, because present developmental 
prospects depend on the still poorly researched laws of the mesoscale between 
quantized and continuous phenomena. It is possible that a more precise 
determination of these laws may considerably restrict technology on a 
mesoscale. Just as there are areas in the macroscopic world that are rather 
unsuitable for human life (such as mountains, icy or sandy deserts, deep seas 
etc.), the mesoscale could turn out to be an area whose structures are only 
conditionally useful for technological purposes. 
The relationship between the two criteria can be formulated in the following 
way: While the narrow sense of the concept of nature permits the determination 
of variable demarcations between natural and artificial properties in 
nanotechnology, the broad sense denotes invariable properties of nature, which 
are preconditions for nanotechnology. The first criterion deals with the dynamic 
boundaries of the natural world, the second with the static limits imposed by 
nature. The one describes what is possible within the scope of the other. 
An important example to which both criteria can be applied is the relationship 
between nanotechnology and living nature, which I discussed in the last 
section. Currently, life is the part of nature most distinct from technology in 
general. The possibility that nanotechnology may in the future produce artificial 
life, similar to or distinct from existing living nature, cannot in principle be 
ruled out. The present discussion of future possibilities indicates that 
technology on a nanoscale will probably be modeled after living nature in order 
to have the best possible conditions for producing artificial products to serve 
human purposes. 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
My thanks to the two anonymous referees for their useful comments, as well as 
to Katja Plaisant and John Michael for their translation. 
 
 
Seite 13 von 18HYLE 11-1 (2005): Nanotechnology and Nature
28.09.2008file://E:\- Eigene Dateien\- 3 eigene Texte\2 Veröffentlichungen (elektr. Kopien)\2000...
Notes 
[1]  "Nanotechnology […] can be oriented either to reproduce natural things or 
processes, exhibiting different features, or to produce new objects or 
materials" (Negrotti 2002, p. 4). 
[2]  E.g. Siegel et al. 1999, p. 11-12, Stix 2001, Jopp 2004, p. 36. 
[3]  The philosophical discussion focuses mainly on issues of ethics, without 
making a problem out of the relationship between nanotechnology and nature. 
Cf. the Nano-STS Bibliography of University of South Carolina 
(www.cla.sc.edu/cpecs/ nirt/bibliography.html), which "includes scholarly 
publications in the history, philosophy, and sociology of nanoscience and 
technology", as well as Baird et al. 2004. One exception is Lee 1999, who 
grounded the distinction between the natural and the artificial upon an 
ontological basis and defended it against the nanotechnological possibility of its 
nearly complete effacement. Schiemann 2004 provides a philosophical 
discussion of the concept of nature, wherein he makes reference to the public 
presentation of nanotechnology. 
[4]  The currently relevant definitions of nanotechnology are discussed at 
length in Schmidt et al. 2003. 
[5]  Biotechnology means in general the technical utilization of advances in the 
methods and instruments of the biological sciences. Genetechnology can be 
understood as a subarea of biotechnology and molecular biology. 
[6]  The term ‘extension’ means the object class that a concept refers to, 
‘intension’ means the class of features that appear in a complete conjunctive 
definition of a concept. Cf. Schiemann 2005 for a more specific definition of 
the extensional and intensional senses of the concept of nature. 
[7]  Historically, the definition of ‘nature’ as that which is not produded by 
humans first became significant in the 19th century. Mill 1874 was particularly 
influential. For a more recent formulation, see Passmore 1974. 
[8]  The extension of the term ‘nature’ in the narrow sense can be defined either 
intensionally by the property of not being produced by human action, or 
extensionally by listing the objects to which it refers. In its broad sense, it can 
be defined only intensionally by the empirical content of the laws of nature, 
which refer to reality in its entirety (the extension in the broad sense). 
[9]  The Turing-test investigates the ability of computers to imitate human 
intelligence: a person interviews two invisible objects, one of which is a human 
being, the other a computer. The person is to determine whether there are 
specific differences in the respective answers. 
[10]  The criterion must be supplemented to make sure that synthetic molecules 
produced on earth would not cease to be considered artificial in the unlikely 
event that they were found to exist extra-terrestrially. 
[11]  Wevers and Wechsler 2002, p. 11. 
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[12]  For Aristotle, for instance, certain parts of a sick human body take on
natural status the moment they are healed. According to Aristotle, medical
treatment of diseases is actually technological. Physicians are technicians, who
produce artificial states in the body that lead to health and thus back to nature
(cf. Schiemann 2005). 
[13]  The relation of the broad sense of the concept of nature to the narrow
sense, which is only defined negatively by reference to human action (cf.
Section 3) is of tensional character inasmuch as the lawful structure of nature
can be understood as a positive (scientific) characterization of nature. Laws,
however, can always be formulated in negation (cf. Popper 1935, p. 39), in
which case nature emerges as a limit to possible human actions. One example is
the theorem of energy conservation, taken as a postulate of the impossibility of
constructing perpetual motion machines of the first kind. 
[14]  Jones 1995, provides an additional argument, related to the concept of
entropy. 
[15]  As long as nanotechnology does not use atoms made of non-natural
elementary particles, its products will not be completely artificial. 
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